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1 Introduction
The U.S. airline industry has a long history of mergers, that starts from
the late 1950s. The concentration of the industry has steadily grown and
is still going on. Since 2010, different major mergers were cleared by the
American authorities: Northwest Airlines - Delta Airlines, Continental Air-
lines - United Airlines, American Airlines - US Airways, and so on. There
is no obvious reason why this concentration phenomenon will stop today, so
it seems reasonable to expect more mergers within the industry in the near
future. Merger simulations are an increasingly popular exercise that allows
Competition authorities to assess the economic impact of mergers. They
were popularized by papers such as Ivaldi & Verboven (2005), from which
this paper is inspired. They remain, by definition, a guess on those impacts.
However, a well defined simulation can provide much more insights than a
“simple” analysis of market shares. Peters (2006) actually performs merger
simulations in the airline industry, using data from the 1980s. He claims
that the performance of the merger simulations is not that good due to a
lack of flexibility. In this paper, the author performs the simulation at the
national level, the marginal costs are recovered, and Bertrand conduct is
assumed. Here, simulations will be performed at the market level, marginal
costs will be directly estimated, and simulations will be based on a general
quantity game. Moreover, the most recent data will be used. The great
availability of airline data in the U.S.A. from the Bureau of Transportation
Statistics appears as an opportunity to simulate mergers in this market.
These data have been used repeatedly in various competition topics, be-
cause of their availability and of the evolution of the industry, that went
from strictly regulated to almost totally liberalized. One example is Boren-
stein (1992). In this paper, the author predicted that the number of airlines
should be greatly reduced to just a few after the large deregulation of the
industry during the late 70s. This is very well observed today. Borenstein
also mentions how competition seems unsustainable in network industries,
thus leading to fewer and fewer firms. In a previous paper, Borenstein (1990)
however demonstrated that some mergers gave increased market power to
some airlines. This was later supported in Kim & Singal (1993), in which
the authors demonstrated that mergers can indeed allow airlines to be more
efficient but still overall lead to increased market power. This paper will
simulate mergers to investigate, ex ante, whether or not they automatically
raise prices and reduce volumes, to see if mergers today are still desirable
and if so, under which conditions. The results of this paper suggest that
the outcome of mergers will strongly depend on which airlines are merging,
such that additional concentration might still be beneficial, as long as it is
regulated.
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Each airline will be considered as a single-product firm, with its own cost
function, and only direct, domestic flights will be considered. Strong as-
sumptions will have to be made. This is a necessary evil, because there
remains uncertainty regarding the reality of demand and costs’ structure,
as well as of firm behaviour, in a given industry and/or market. Careful
choices and explicit statements of those assumptions nevertheless allow to
assess the credibility of the simulation. One should not forget that it remains
a modelling exercise that will not perfectly fit the reality, yet can provide
important insights. Some aspects will thus not be considered in great de-
tails, such as the coordinated effects of the mergers, or the entry (or exit)
of new airlines.
It seems appropriate, before going further, to define what is a market in
this industry. Airline companies exploit different markets that correspond
to different routes. Hence, a flight from Chicago O’Hare airport to New
York City John F. Kennedy airport and a flight from New York City La-
Guardia airport to Chicago Midway airport will be considered to belong to
the same market: the “Chicago - New York City” market (or “New York
City - Chicago” market). This definition is found in numerous papers, such
as Evans & Kessides (1993).
A summary of the commonly accepted best practices should then be made.
First of all, one should check that the model’s predictions are coherent. This
will be assessed throughout the exercise. Moreover, the chosen model should
be rational with the way the considered industry works. In the short term,
airlines compete in prices, but in the long term they can also adjust their
capacities, which is extremely costly in the short term. Therefore, airlines
engage in the following game. In the first stage, they set their capacities
(basically choosing how much planes to rent or buy and on which routes,
and signing contracts for fuel and labour supply). The outcome of this stage
is public. Then, in the second stage, airlines face the demand and compete
in prices, with virtually infinite costs when producing above their capaci-
ties. Every airlines know that all competitors must commit to their first
stage decision in the short run. This corresponds to the Edgeworth solu-
tion to the Bertrand paradox stating that price competition must lead to
the competitive outcome in oligopoly. This commitment on capacity allows
airlines to gain some market power. This is due to the rationing of supply:
for instance, if a passenger is looking for the cheapest airline’s flights on a
specific day and they are full, she must turn to a more expensive airline that
now holds her captive. This is exactly what Kreps & Scheinkman (1983)
modelled. Their conclusion was really interesting: in a capacity-then-price
game, with linear demand, constant marginal costs and efficient rationing,
the outcome is exactly Cournot’s. Doing so allows airlines to soften the
competition and escape the Bertrand paradox. To support this, Brander &
Zhang (1990) showed that data on airlines conduct fits Cournot much better
than Bertrand or cartel models. For this reason, the simulation model will
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be derived from a quantity game, even though airlines compete in prices in
the short term. This is supported in Belleflamme & Peitz (2009).
An additional point to make is product differentiation. Indeed, not all air-
lines propose the same flight experience: the service standards differ from
one airline to another: services such as Wi-Fi, meals, luggages, entertain-
ment, etc., might be extras or included services, and their quality can signif-
icantly differ. Gayle (2004) demonstrates that passengers’ choices regarding
airlines depend, if not more, at least significantly on non-price characteris-
tics. This can be seen with the many partnerships created between airlines
and, for instance, food, coffee, or telecommunication firms. Flight atten-
dants might be more trained within some airlines than within others. Some
airlines offer flights at more convenient departure times, or to better located
and/or equipped airports or terminals (that are more expensive for airlines)
for the same destination. Some fly more spacious or luxury planes than
others, equipped with more or less comfortable seats. Finally, most airlines
propose mileage fidelity bonuses, which can greatly motivate a passenger to
stick to her usual airline. This product differentiation is well seen through
the various brand strategies adopted by airlines. It allows airlines to keep
a certain degree of market power in a market that would otherwise be ex-
tremely competitive (it is already very competitive, but airlines manage to
exploit elasticities as will be showed later). Each airline thus faces its own
demand function. Finally, firms will be assumed, as usual, to maximize their
profits. The model used will thus be a general quantity game.
Another consideration has to be made regarding the dynamics of the model.
When two airlines merge, we will not expect them to launch a new product
that would change the structure of the market: the airlines will keep on sell-
ing their respective products. The difference will be that joint profits will be
maximized instead, and that it will be possible to redirect passengers from
one merging airline to the other if profitable by, for instance, increasing the
price of the cheapest of the two to redirect passengers to the most expensive
airline. At most the merger will generate efficiencies and cost reductions,
which will be considered. It is possible, however, that a new airline enters
the market in the long term. For those reasons, a static model seems fine
to suit the industry, but predictions should be considered in the short-to-
medium term, because of the possible entry. The approach will thus remain
simple.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1 reviews the estima-
tion of different parameters that are necessary to perform the simulations.
A total cost function will be econometricaly estimated at the national level,
with time and firm fixed effects. A marginal cost function will be derived
from this total cost function, allowing for marginal costs estimations for
each firm at each time period. Then, using already estimated elasticities,
demand function parameters on each markets will be recovered. In Section
2, the merger simulations are performed for different markets, each time for
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a variety of merger scenarios, using the parameters estimated in Section 1.
In both sections, the models and results will be presented. Finally, Section
3 concludes.
2 Estimation
In this section, the key parameters used in the simulation model are es-
timated. Section 2.1 econometricaly estimates cost function parameters.
Section 2.2 recovers demand function parameters from previous works.
2.1 Cost Function
2.1.1 Data and Variables
All data come from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, an agency
within the United States Department of Transportation. Its databases are
well known and trusted. In particular the following databases were used:
• Air Carrier Financial: Schedule P-6. For quarterly data on the wage
bills (in thousands of dollars) of airlines, with observations for each
airline in its different geographical operating regions. Approximately
500 observations per quarter’s dataset.
• Air Carrier Financial: Schedule P-10. For yearly data on the num-
ber of employees, with observations for each airline in its different
geographical operating regions. Approximately 120 observations per
year’s dataset.
• Air Carrier Financial: Schedule P-5.2. For quarterly data on total
costs (in thousands of dollars), with observations for each airline in its
different geographical operating regions and each aircraft type. Ap-
proximately 1700 observations per quarter’s dataset.
• Air Carrier Financial: Schedule 12(a). For monthly data on fuel to-
tal expenditure and consumptions, with observations for each airline.
Approximately 750 observations per month’s dataset.
• Air Carriers: T100 Domestic Segment (US Carriers). For monthly
data on passengers, available seats, number of departures, distance
flown and distance between airports (both in miles), with observations
for each airline in its different routes (at the airport level). Approxi-
mately 330000 observations per month’s database.
• Origin and Destination Survey: DB1B Market. For quarterly data on
market fares. This is a 10% sample of all domestic tickets sold in the
U.S.A. Millions of observations per month’s dataset.
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An important work of aggregation was required. i will denote an airline,
y a year, q a quarter, m a month, r a route, g a geographical region, a an
aircraft. Data on wage bills (WBi,y,q =
∑
gWBi,y,q,g) were summed across
geographical operating regions of an airlines. Data on the number of em-
ployees was assumed stable over a given year, such that the same yearly ob-
servations was used for each quarter of that year, in order to obtain quarterly
data (Li,y,q = Li,y). Data on total costs (TCi,y,q =
∑
g
∑
a TCi,y,q,g,a) were
summed across geographical operating regions and aircraft types of an air-
lines. Data on total fuel expenditure (TFEi,y,q =
∑
m TFCi,y,q,m, ∀m ∈ q)
and total fuel consumption (TFCi,y,q =
∑
m TFCi,y,q,m,∀m ∈ q) were
summed across months of a quarter. Data on passengers (Qi,y,q =∑
r
∑
mQi,y,q,r,m, ∀m ∈ q), available seats (ASi,y,q =
∑
r
∑
mASi,y,q,r,m,∀m
∈ q), number of departures (NDi,y,q =
∑
r
∑
mNDi,y,q,r,m, ∀m ∈ q) miles
flown (Mi,y,q =
∑
r
∑
mMi,y,q,r,m,∀m ∈ q) and miles between airports
(M i,y,q =
∑
r
∑
mM i,y,q,r,m, ∀m ∈ q) were summed across months of a quar-
ter and across routes.
Every observations where no passengers were transported (cargo) or no de-
partures were made are discarded.
Different variables were then created (in what follows the (i, y, q) index
is dropped for convenience):
• W = WBL , for labour price;
• F = TFETFC for fuel price;
• RPM = Q×M , for Revenue Passengers Miles;
• ASM = AS ×M , for Available Seats Miles
• ASL = MND , for Average Stage Length;
• LF = RPMASM , for Load Factor;
• TC, for Total Costs (used as such).
Summary statistics of these variables, for the years 2008 to 2016, are
provided in Table 1.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Total Costs (C) 676,855,985 1,082,397,423 3,121,650 5,875,292,000
Passengers (Q) 5,685,753 7,963,273 17 39,895,892
Labour Price (pL) 15,9712 18,444 12 348,984
Fuel Price (pF ) 2.715 2.445 0.341 61.902
ASL 853 383 176 2,000
LF 0.734 0.162 0.013 1
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For Total Costs, Passengers and Labour Price, the standard deviation
being greater than the mean suggests a skew towards high values, so the
Min of theses variables does not give much information (it could have been
that there are outliers but a Residuals-Leverage plot for the regression of
the cost function, which can be found in the Appendix, suggests this is not
the case).
2.1.2 Model
As explained in Davis & Garce´s (2006), a Cobb-Douglas production function
defined as
Q = α0L
αLFαF u (1)
yields the following cost function from cost minimization:
C = kQ1/rp
αL/r
L p
αF /r
F v (2)
where v = u−1/r, r = αL + αF and k = r(α0ααLL α
αF
F )
−1/r.
Taking the natural logarithm of equation (2) provides an expression suitable
for linear regression, in the form
ln(C) = β0 + βQ ln(Q) + βL ln(pL) + βF ln(pF ) + v (3)
Moreover, it is common to consider Average Stage Length and Load Factor
as potential determinants of airline costs. These can be found, for instance,
in Ng & Seabright (2001). We will thus integrate them in the estimation.
Finally, dummy variables for airlines, years and quarters are created and
added to allow for changes in the intercept. It gives the following:
ln(C) = β0 + βQ ln(Q) + βL ln(pL) + βF ln(pF ) + βASL ln(ASL)
+ βLF ln(LF ) + δ1 × FIRM + δ2 × Y EAR+ δ3 ×QUARTER+ v (4)
Finally, we impose βL + βF = 1 to satisfy the homogeneity of the cost
function in input prices. The actual regression is thus:
ln(C)− ln(pF ) = β0 + βQ ln(Q) + βL
(
ln(pL)− ln(pF )
)
+ βASL ln(ASL)
+ βLF ln(LF ) + δ1 × FIRM + δ2 × Y EAR+ δ3 ×QUARTER+ v (5)
This specification of the regression gives the cost function as :
C(Q) = αQβQpβLL p
βF
F ASL
βASLLF βLF (6)
where α = exp(β0 + δ1×FIRM + δ2×Y EAR+ δ3×QUARTER), and the
marginal cost function as:
MC(Q) =
∂C(Q)
∂Q
(7)
= αβQQ
βQ−1pβLL p
βF
F ASL
βASLLF βLF (8)
It is also interesting to note that the average cost function is:
AC(Q) = αQβQ−1pβLL p
βF
F ASL
βASLLF βLF (9)
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2.1.3 Results
Equation (5) parameters are estimated using standard OLS, with data rang-
ing from 2008 to 2016. Estimation results are shown in Table 2.
They appear quite robust. In columns (1) and (2), year and quarter dum-
mies are dropped consecutively, and in column (3) the insignificant variable
Average Stage Length is dropped. This does not change the significance of
the parameters, and their values only slightly vary. In addition to being
insignificant, the ASL parameter is estimated very close to zero. The pa-
rameter for pF is recovered as βF = 1 − βL = 1 − 0.481 = 0.519. Using
these estimates in equation (8) gives estimated marginal costs. As an ex-
ample, a subset of estimated marginal costs can be found in Table 3 for top
US airlines in the fourth quarter of 2016 on the Chicago - New York City
route. These estimations appear coherent with the airline type, as they are
significantly smaller for low-cost airlines.
2.2 Demand Function
Kim (2006) estimates airlines’ conditional (that is, “conditional on the ex-
penditure for air trip”) own and cross price elasticities, εkj , at the market
level, according to the number of airlines present in this market, using the
Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) specification. These elasticities will
be used in the simulation model. In the merger simulation model that will
be used, a system of linear demand functions is used, as:
qk = Dk(p) = ak +
J∑
j=1
bkjpj , for k = 1, . . . , J (10)
The demand constants ak and parameters bkj are required and not provided
in the previous paper, so they will have to be approximated.
Using the formula for price elasticities, at the firm level, we have that:
εkj =
∂Dk(p)
∂pj
pj
Dk(p)
(11)
Moreover, from equation (10) we have that:
∂Dk(p)
∂pj
= bkj (12)
So we recover the bkj parameters as:
bkj = εkj
Dk(p)
pj
(13)
The demand constants ak are then recovered as:
ak = Dk(p)−
J∑
j=1
bkjpj (14)
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Table 3: Marginal Costs (2016 Q4, Chicago - New York City route)
Airline Type Estimated Marginal Cost ($)
American Airlines Standard 62.26
Delta Air Lines Standard 62.63
Southwest Airlines Low Cost 29.94
United Airlines Standard 88.24
JetBlue Airways Low Cost 44.15
Spirit Airlines Low Cost 26.83
3 Merger Simulation
So far three important parameters were obtained: marginal costs, demand
constants and demand parameters. They will be used within the following
merger simulation model.
3.1 Model
The model used for the merger simulations can be found in Davis & Garce´s
(2006). We will not go into the details of the derivation of the merger
model, as this is already well explained in the book previously cited. We
will, however, recall its main components.
The following expression is provided for quantity games:(
p
q
)
=
(
I ∆ · (B′)−1
−B′ I
)−1(
c
a
)
(15)
p is the resulting price vector, of length J the number of products in the
market. In our case, we will consider that a flight with an operating carrier
represents one product. For instance, a seat in an American Airlines flight
and a seat in an Envoy Air will be considered two different products, even if
Envoy Air and American Airlines are owned by American Airlines Group. q
is the quantity vector, of length J as well. ∆ ·B is the Hadamard product of
∆ and B. ∆ is the symmetric ownership matrix representing the ownership
structure in the market. For instance, in a market with airline brands 1 (e.g.
American Airlines), 2 (e.g. United Airlines), 3 (e.g. Envoy Air) and 4 (e.g
Southwest Airlines), we will have:
∆ =

1 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
 (16)
That is, ∆3,1 = ∆1,3 = 1 because American Airlines and Envoy Air are
both owned by American Airlines Group. B′ is a (J × J) matrix of demand
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Table 4: Busiest domestic routes, Sep. 2014 - Aug. 2015
Route Passengers
Chicago - New York City 4,020,000
Los Angeles - San Francisco 3,660,000
Los Angeles - New York City 3,420,000
Chicago - Los Angeles 3,010,000
Miami - New York City 2,750,000
parameters, such that:
B′ =

b11 . . . b1j . . . b1J
...
...
...
bk1 . . . bkj . . . bkJ
...
...
...
bJ1 . . . bJj . . . bJJ
 (17)
I is a (J × J) identity matrix. c is a vector of marginal costs and a a vector
of demand constants. B′, c and a thus come from what was obtained in
Section 2. Equation (15) comes from a system of 2J equations that solve J
quantity setting equations (Equation (18)) simultaneously with J demand
equations (Equation (19)), respectively:
(∆ · (B′)−1)q + p− c = 0 (18)
q = a+B′p (19)
The J quantity setting equations simply are the matrix form of the first-
order conditions of a profit maximizing firm:
J∑
j=1
∆kj
∂Pj(q)
∂qk
qj + (Pk(q)− ck) = 0 (20)
where
p = (B′)−1q − (B′)−1a (21)
3.2 Results
The previous model will be applied on the 5 most frequented domestic routes
in the US on the most recent data (the last quarter of 2016) to simulate the
effects of different merger scenarios. These routes can be seen in Table 4.
Because mergers can create cost efficiencies, different cases will be consid-
ered: when the merging parties enjoy no cost reduction, a 5% cost reduction
and a 10% cost reduction. In order to use the already available elastici-
ties, it is required to order airlines in decreasing order according to their
10
Table 5: Domestic Market Shares, 2016
Airline Share
Southwest (WN) 19.1%
Delta (DL) 18.3%
American (AA) 16.9%
United (UA) 14.5%
JetBlue (B6) 5.5%
Alaska (AS) 4.6%
US Airways (US) 3%
Spirit (NK) 2.4%
SkyWest (OO) 2.3%
Frontier (F9) 1.9%
Other 11.7%
Table 6: Chicago - New York City
Airline Price ($) Quantity Marginal Cost ($) Profit ($)
WN 169.56 274274 29.94 38291932
DL 205.27 57135 62.63 8149657
AA 207.67 415959 64.26 59652964
UA 261.14 547425 88.24 94645376
B6 169.06 40811 44.15 5097779
NK 93.27 50698 27.05 3357405
OO 171.36 6027 25.43 879503
S5 235.11 106162 40.37 20673576
national, domestic market share. Table 5 provides domestic market shares
of the major U.S. airlines.
3.2.1 Market 1: Chicago - New York City
The “Chicago - New York City” market is the largest domestic market in
the U.S.A. The distance between the two cities is 1146 kilometres, or 712
miles. This is considered short haul by Eurocontrol, as it lays below 1500
kilometres (this threshold can vary between institutions and airlines, but
this route is always considered as short haul). Table 6 presents the airlines
present in this market, with their prices, quantities and estimated marginal
costs and profits, ranked according to their domestic market share as in
Table 5. Alaska Airlines, US Airways and Frontier Airlines are not present
in this market. Kim (2006) considers at most 8 airlines per market, which
leaves room for an additional firm, Shuttle America (S5), the largest airline
in this particular market that is not present in Table 5. Using mean prices
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and mean estimated marginal costs on this market, the price elasticity should
be:
P −MC
P
= − 1
Ed
⇔ Ed = − P
P −MC = −1.34 (22)
This is consistent with the estimated route level elasticity in Pearce & Smyth
(2008) that ranges from -1.2 to -1.5, and is a sign that estimated marginal
costs should be correct.
The ranking at the market level is not the same as the one at the national
level. Every firms in this market are independent airlines, no airline is owned
by another. The original ownership matrix thus is :
∆ = I8×8 (23)
The demand parameters are, rounded:
B′ =

−1759 49 107 122 5 1 0 0
4 −240 −237 5 −10 −14 0 −3
−1 −83 −1115 −392 −6 6 −1 −19
23 31 −258 −1408 −17 7 −1 −2
30 −72 −83 −624 −162 41 3 −2
17 −198 584 475 79 −478 −3 51
4 −30 −368 −638 47 −26 −24 71
10 12 −444 −65 0 28 5 −364

(24)
and
a =

555953
140380
872681
1161088
59992
85476
9257
180900

(25)
Mergers will be considered to change the original ownership structure. In
this market, a merger between Southwest (WN) and Delta (DL) will trans-
late into ∆1,2 = ∆2,1 = 1, when it was ∆1,2 = ∆2,1 = 0 pre merger. Indeed,
Southwest is ranked first and Delta second. This will be repeated through-
out the rest of the paper. Six merger scenarios are considered in Tables
7 to 12. Table 7 corresponds to predicted prices and quantities without
cost efficiencies, while Tables 8 and 9 consider efficiencies of respectively 5%
and 10% for the merging parties. Tables 10 to 12 present the same but for
estimated profits.
Some general observations can be made.
First of all, from Table 7 that shows predicted prices and quantities, as well
as their predicted change from the original situation, it can be seen that
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Table 10: Chicago - N.Y., Profits, No Cost Efficiencies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WN
38298836 38287039 38288595 38305577 38322841 38328820
0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.08 0.1
DL
8034368 8084449 7810040 7890339 7682963 7757262
-1.41 -0.8 -4.17 -3.18 -5.73 -4.81
AA
58780974 59659315 62086666 61749479 57242764 57233368
-1.46 0.01 4.08 3.51 -4.04 -4.06
UA
94981191 94306245 96285900 96330535 95037122 95396836
0.35 -0.36 1.73 1.78 0.41 0.79
B6
5069385 5096478 5218414 5202463 5010516 5011371
-0.56 -0.03 2.37 2.05 -1.71 -1.7
NK
3339087 3359240 3412362 3413551 3319031 3317106
-0.55 0.05 1.64 1.67 -1.14 -1.2
OO
878380 878933 889117 887746 874601 875184
-0.13 -0.06 1.09 0.94 -0.56 -0.49
S5
20666156 20660415 20824668 20821452 20639538 20651969
-0.04 -0.06 0.73 0.72 -0.16 -0.1
Table 11: Chicago - N.Y., Profits, 5% Cost Efficiencies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WN
38707742 38697961 38289250 38708976 38726931 39119657
1.09 1.06 -0.01 1.09 1.14 2.16
DL
8208072 8107513 8033879 8080292 7855540 8104757
0.72 -0.52 -1.42 -0.85 -3.61 -0.55
AA
58855622 60966769 63615247 63409143 58731286 57387961
-1.34 2.2 6.64 6.3 -1.55 -3.8
UA
94924357 94453153 96445939 98883719 97555983 97645527
0.29 -0.2 1.9 4.48 3.08 3.17
B6
5071788 5096471 5222953 5213343 5019380 5013391
-0.51 -0.03 2.46 2.27 -1.54 -1.66
NK
3340900 3358200 3413697 3414394 3319029 3387483
-0.49 0.02 1.68 1.7 -1.14 0.9
OO
878489 879229 889635 888817 875537 876197
-0.12 -0.03 1.15 1.06 -0.45 -0.38
S5
20667094 20667690 20834202 20832319 20648665 20648533
-0.03 -0.03 0.78 0.77 -0.12 -0.12
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Table 12: Chicago - New York City, Profits, 10% Cost Efficiencies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WN
39118811 39111069 38289905 39114477 39133134 39131188
2.16 2.14 -0.01 2.15 2.2 2.19
DL
8383629 8130609 8260713 8272428 8030026 8119496
2.87 -0.23 1.36 1.51 -1.47 -0.37
AA
58930318 62286279 65160041 65088069 60236685 57402307
-1.21 4.41 9.23 9.11 0.98 -3.77
UA
94867539 94600175 96606109 101468165 100105519 100036278
0.23 -0.05 2.07 7.21 5.77 5.7
B6
5074191 5096464 5227495 5224234 5028251 5011033
-0.46 -0.03 2.54 2.48 -1.36 -1.7
NK
3342713 3357160 3415033 3415237 3319028 3454772
-0.44 -0.01 1.72 1.72 -1.14 2.9
OO
878598 879525 890153 889889 876472 877032
-0.1 0 1.21 1.18 -0.34 -0.28
S5
20668032 20674965 20843738 20843190 20657795 20643325
-0.03 0.01 0.82 0.82 -0.08 -0.15
the outcome of mergers strongly depends on which firms are merging. It
seems that a single merger between Southwest Airlines (WN) and its clos-
est competitors would have the least impact: Columns (1) and (2) show
that Southwest would only slightly adjust its prices and quantities, while
Delta (DL) and American (AA) would adjust them more. They would both
increase their prices and decrease their quantities if they are the one merg-
ing, which is quite expected, and they would also both decrease their prices
and quantities if they were not part of the merger with Southwest, yet only
slightly. As a whole, if Southwest merges with Delta, 7864 tickets less would
be sold in total, and the average ticket would be 0.37$ more expensive.
If it merges with American, 5328 tickets less would be sold in total, and
the average ticket would be 0.23$ more expensive. Both situations would
only slightly harm consumers. Introducing cost efficiencies would only re-
duce the strength of the price and quantity changes, except if the merger
between Southwest and American leads to a 10% cost reduction for both:
in this situation American would actually reduce its price and increase its
quantities. The percentage changes, however, stay really close to zero, so
there probably is not much to infer from these two possible mergers, except
that mergers between Southwest and either Delta or American would not
have a significant impact on consumer welfare, probably because Southwest
differs too much from Delta and American in terms of quality of service,
and that the cost efficiency impacts Southwest much less since its marginal
costs are already low compared to Delta and American.
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Columns (3) and (4) show something interesting: a merger between Delta
and American would lead them to decrease their prices and increase their
quantities, whether or not their more direct competitors Southwest and
United (UA) merge as well. This time the percentage changes are much
more important. If Delta and American were to be the only airlines merg-
ing, the average ticket would be 5.89$ cheaper, and 88026 additional tickets
would be sold. This would be a great improvement for consumers. If South-
west and United were also to merge, then the average ticket price would
decrease less: 4.72$ cheaper. Same goes for quantities, that would increase
less: 72691 more tickets. It thus seems that there would not be much con-
cerns to have regarding the potential mergers that would follow, since they
would only slightly reduce the gains from the merger. However, would the
merger be profitable for the firms? The answer is not obvious as, for in-
stance, the Delta entity would suffer from a 4.17% decrease in profits while
the American entity would enjoy a 4.08% increase in profits, in case (3),
without cost efficiencies. This can be seen in Table 10. The sum of Delta’s
and American’s profits would actually increase by 2,094,084$, so this is a
likely scenario that would actually benefit both consumers and airlines, for
this particular market. This is probably due to the fact that they would
be able to reallocate their production given the demand elasticities, such
that their production would be more optimal as a whole. This means that
reducing prices and increasing quantities alone is not profitable for neither
of the two airlines: Delta tickets and American tickets would then be com-
plement goods. This is either a first limit of our model or a surprising result
that might be explained. One possible explanation could be the following.
Suppose for instance that a passenger wishes to arrive at 8pm on her out-
ward journey and to return 5 days later, arriving at 6pm. Delta proposes one
flight that suits the passenger for the outward journey and so does American
for the return journey. If Delta decides to increase its price, the passengers
might choose to depart a day earlier, possibly with a different airline, and
thus return a day earlier, possibly with a different airline as well. In the end,
Delta increasing its price leads to American not selling this ticket. Another
possible explanation could be the following. The passenger wishes to fly ei-
ther Delta or American on her round trip. If Delta increases its ticket price
for the outward journey, the passenger might decide to switch to low-cost,
e.g. Southwest, for the return journey, so that her budget for the round
trip does not change. So Delta increasing its price leads to American not
selling its ticket. By coordinating their price decrease, Delta and American
create a synergy that is not based on costs but rather on demand. Doing
so alone might lead to greater losses on earnings by not proposing the high
price than gains by selling more tickets. Again, as expected, the cost effi-
ciencies allow Delta and American to decrease their price and increase their
quantities even more.
Columns (5) and (6) show that different merger combinations, other than
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one where Delta and American merge, give a result closer to what is usually
expected after a merger. It seems that a merger between Delta and United
would this time increase prices and reduce quantities. For instance, in case
(5), 39653 tickets less would be sold at 2.12$ more. However, the merger
would not be profitable for the newly formed entity without cost efficiencies.
We might then expect that if Delta and United were to propose a merger,
their claim that it would lead to cost efficiencies would be credible, because
they would not propose the merger in the first place without it. Would there
be enough efficiencies for airlines to pass them on to consumers ? At 5%
cost efficiency, the average ticket price would increase by 1.46$, while total
quantities offered would decrease by 27901, or 1.86% of the total quanti-
ties sold pre-merger. At 10% cost efficiency, the average ticket price would
increase by 0.80$, while total quantities offered would decrease by 16150,
or 1.08% of the total quantities sold pre-merger. It seems pretty safe to
imagine that such a merger could be cleared by competition authorities. We
can imagine that there would be reaction from the competitors after such
a merger. It is likely that a merger between Southwest and another airline
will not greatly change prices and quantities afterwards, even if it merges
with another low-cost airline, as can be seen in the tables.
Cost efficiencies always have the expected influence on price and quantity
changes, except for Delta in the case of 10% cost efficiencies, Column (6).
The price increase and quantity decrease are greater in this case compared
to the 5% case. However, the Delta-United entity proposes a lower average
price (-1.47$) and a greater total quantity (+4873 seats), so it is important
to look at the newly formed entity rather than at the individual parts of
this entity. Moreover, in every cases competing airlines not involved in the
merger only have mild reactions. The airline that reacts the most to the
mergers is JetBlue, another low-cost carrier. Its largest reaction is in case
(6) for a 10% cost efficiency gain for prices (-1.55%), and in case (3) for a
10% cost efficiency gain for quantities (+2.16%), which are quite close to
zero.
3.2.2 Market 2: Los Angeles - San Francisco
The second largest market is the Los Angeles - San Francisco pair. The two
cities are 560 kilometres apart, or 348 miles, so we are once again dealing
with a short haul flight. The section will be organised similarly to the
previous one. Table 13 presents the market. US Airways is not present in
the market. Alaska Airlines, despite being the sixth airline on the national
market, appears as a really small player on this route. The price elasticity
on this market should be, computed as in equation (22):
Ed = − P
P −MC = −1.56 (26)
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Table 13: Los Angeles - San Francisco
Airline Price Quantity Marginal Costs Profits
WN 141.97 1689116 31.05 187362856
DL 149.81 161318 64.94 13692672
AA 153.60 92850 66.63 8074776
UA 190.70 348461 91.49 34568342
B6 120.74 172922 45.78 12962561
AS 103.12 397 44.54 23253
NK 74.87 59705 28.04 2795667
OO 177.57 211570 26.37 31989085
This is slightly below the range proposed in Pearce & Smyth (2008), but as
an approximation it is still relatively close. The original ownership matrix
is again:
∆ = I8×8 (27)
as in equation (23). The demand parameters this time are:
B′ =

−12944 165 28 93 29 0 1 0
33 −931 −72 4 −61 0 −6 −8
−11 −319 −336 −338 −34 0 −15 54
194 120 −78 −1227 −102 0 −17 −7
265 −287 −26 −557 −966 0 49 −7
98 −506 117 273 303 −3 −30 92
67 −193 −188 −930 457 0 −548 325
85 48 −131 −54 −1 0 71 −962

(28)
and
a =

3423838
396358
194799
739085
254195
669
91706
360515

(29)
The first three and the fifth merger scenarios are the same as in the pre-
vious subsection. The fourth and sixth one are different and allow to gain
additional insight. The same tables are then presented, adapted for this
particular market, from Table 14 to Table 19.
Looking at Table 14, one can observe that the outcome of the first three
scenarios, as well as the fifth one, are really similar between this market
and the previous one. This might signal that what happens in a market
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Table 17: L.A. - S.F., Profits, No Cost Efficiencies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WN
187397908 187332895 187342897 187004310 187490590 187554591
0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.19 0.07 0.1
DL
13510362 13567650 12644115 14100547 12953400 13065223
-1.33 -0.91 -7.66 2.98 -5.4 -4.58
AA
7943615 8087066 8333763 7891023 7757373 7748114
-1.62 0.15 3.21 -2.28 -3.93 -4.05
UA
34710049 34425508 35173520 34568109 34806947 34891710
0.41 -0.41 1.75 0 0.69 0.94
B6
12885734 12959095 13270239 13213695 12748591 12759801
-0.59 -0.03 2.37 1.94 -1.65 -1.56
AS
23113 23268 23659 22881 22985 22993
-0.61 0.06 1.74 -1.6 -1.15 -1.12
NK
2791512 2793559 2828517 2850175 2779135 2783476
-0.15 -0.08 1.18 1.95 -0.59 -0.44
OO
31978108 31969599 32193227 32238036 31941576 31962685
-0.03 -0.06 0.64 0.78 -0.15 -0.08
Table 18: L.A. - S.F., Profits, 5% Cost Efficiencies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WN
189999926 189949314 187347461 189560266 190057890 190082372
1.41 1.38 -0.01 1.17 1.44 1.45
DL
14013333 13634085 13288374 14648416 13451291 13542300
2.34 -0.43 -2.95 6.98 -1.76 -1.1
AA
7960429 8382355 8676842 8257831 8092469 7789028
-1.42 3.81 7.46 2.27 0.22 -3.54
UA
34676850 34516256 35270385 36290917 36419901 36537542
0.31 -0.15 2.03 4.98 5.36 5.7
B6
12895491 12959290 13288015 13256722 12783646 13176284
-0.52 -0.03 2.51 2.27 -1.38 1.65
AS
23133 23256 23674 22882 22985 22965
-0.52 0.01 1.81 -1.6 -1.15 -1.24
NK
2792104 2795133 2831276 2856294 2784142 2782847
-0.13 -0.02 1.27 2.17 -0.41 -0.46
OO
31980083 31985007 32213502 32261897 31960971 31963234
-0.03 -0.01 0.7 0.85 -0.09 -0.08
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Table 19: L.A. - S.F., Profits, 10% Cost Efficiencies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WN
192619751 192583752 187352024 192133435 192642528 192626935
2.81 2.79 -0.01 2.55 2.82 2.81
DL
14525449 13700683 13947174 15206683 13958482 14027816
6.08 0.06 1.86 11.06 1.94 2.45
AA
7977259 8681917 9025664 8631477 8433542 7830047
-1.21 7.52 11.78 6.89 4.44 -3.03
UA
34643667 34607122 35367382 38049491 38065557 38217480
0.22 0.11 2.31 10.07 10.12 10.56
B6
12905252 12959484 13305803 13299819 12818749 13598225
-0.44 -0.02 2.65 2.6 -1.11 4.9
AS
23154 23245 23689 22882 22986 22938
-0.43 -0.04 1.87 -1.6 -1.15 -1.36
NK
2792696 2796708 2834036 2862419 2789153 2782218
-0.11 0.04 1.37 2.39 -0.23 -0.48
OO
31982058 32000419 32233784 32285767 31980371 31963782
-0.02 0.04 0.76 0.93 -0.03 -0.08
will most likely also happen in similar markets, that is at least when the
concerned parties are present in both markets. This similarity persists even
when cost efficiencies are introduced. For this reason, there is no further
analysis to be made regarding these four scenarios as the one from the last
subsection also applies here.
However, scenarios (4) and (6) are different. In case (4) the average price
decreases by 1.20$ and 65950 more seats are offered in total, even without
cost efficiencies. The same phenomenon as in the previous market for cases
(3) and (4) thus appears, but it is not in the same proportions. The price
decrease is not as important. The effect of the cost efficiencies is still as
expected, that is the greater the cost efficiencies, the more average prices
decrease and quantities increase. Is it profitable ? Without cost efficiencies,
the merging parties in scenario (4) would have different variations of their
profits: Southwest and Delta would see their joint profit increase by 49329$
while American and United would see their joint profit decrease by 183987$.
The producer surplus would be greatly reduced. However, introducing cost
efficiencies of 5% allows all merging firms to increase their profits: American
and United would enjoy a profit increase equivalent to its decrease without
cost efficiencies, that is a 4.5% increase, while Southwest and Delta would
enjoy a 1.5% increase in their joint profits, compared to the case without ef-
ficiencies. Overall, prices either decrease more or increase less and quantities
either increase more or decrease less when cost efficiencies are introduced,
and even more with greater cost efficiencies.
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Table 20: Los Angeles - New York City
Airline Price Quantities Marginal Costs Profits
DL 506.6 271054 59.1 121288494
AA 594.2 181734 60.7 96965772
UA 508.5 393345 83.3 167181664
B6 347.0 288377 41.7 88030798
VX 410.5 211783 53.1 75675957
3.2.3 Market 3: Los Angeles - New York City
The third market corresponds to the city pair Los Angeles - New York City.
The distance between the two cities is 3937 kilometres, or 2446 miles. This
is very close to the limit set by Eurocontrol between medium haul and long
haul, so this market is very different from the first two. The consequence is
that, since only direct flights were considered, the market will not necessarily
be correctly represented as some airlines do not propose this flight directly,
due to the long distance between the two cities. This might be a flaw of this
paper, and considering the different flight combinations allowing to go from
Los Angeles to New York City (and the other way around) was beyond its
scope. However, it will be interesting to see how this lack of representation
impacts the predictions. It might be possible to correctly simulate mergers
between firms that propose direct flights if direct flights and indirect flights
actually are two separate markets. This would actually go along with one of
the findings in Berry & Jia (2010): consumers have an increasingly strong
preference for direct fligths, which might support the idea of considering
them as separate markets. The firms present in the direct flight market
can be seen in Table 20. Only Delta, American, United and JetBlue are
present from Table 5. Virgin America (VX) was added, as the only other
airline exploiting this route directly. Comparing Table 20 with Table 13 for
instance, predicted marginal costs appear slightly lower in this market even
if the distance is greater and the tickets are more expensive. Either our cost
function is not adapted to direct long haul flights, or this is actually true: it
might be less costly to add a passenger in a long haul flight than in a short
haul flight, as planes are much bigger and transport much more passengers
per flights. Moreover, planes for longer haul have different engines (shaft
engines, reaction engines, etc.) that are built to be efficient for certain flying
distances. The price difference is probably explained by much larger fixed
costs (or marginal costs relatively to the flight and not to the seat). The
price difference reveals other sources of costs that are not marginal relatively
to the passenger but to the flight: there must be an important difference in
terms of fuel consumption (surely twice as much), parking fees (that depends
on the size of the aircraft, which is bigger, and the time spent on the ground,
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which is longer), airport services (larger hubs are required at airports, which
are more expensive), organisation (more employees are needed to register
and help passengers), the aircraft itself, and so on. These flights also do not
depart as often in a day as short haul flights. One indication will be whether
the predictions make sense or not. An other indication is the estimated price
elasticity, which is calculated as:
Ed = − P
P −MC = −1.14 (30)
This is not more distant from the estimated range in Pearce & Smyth (2008)
as was the previous market, so the results might make sense. The merger
simulation will be performed with an original ownership matrix that is again
the identity matrix (5× 5), and the following demand parameters:
B′ =

−478 −79 8 −45 −8
−184 −234 34 75 −12
54 24 −810 −62 −34
−247 271 −176 −718 117
−150 −103 −284 237 −355
 (31)
and
a =

742417
297135
958582
450156
345206
 (32)
As in previous subsections, merger simulation results are presented, from
Table 21 to Table 26.
Compared to previous markets, these mergers induce much larger reac-
tions from merging parties, on average. Firms reduce their prices in cases
(1), (3), (4) and (6), without cost efficiencies and in quite large proportions.
Cases (2) and (5) are the only one that generate a price increase. The change
proportions (for instance, Delta reduces its price by 40.64% and increases
its quantities by 74.92% if it merges with American) are much larger than
what we encountered previously. This might be due to the market being
more concentrated, that is, in previous markets a single market reduced the
number of firms by 12.5% whereas now it is by 20%, and a double merger
reduced the number of firms by 25% whereas now it is by 40%. Let us look
at the evolution of average prices and total quantities on the market after
the different scenarios, firstly without cost efficiencies.
In scenario (1), the average ticket would be sold 62.4$ cheaper and 253793
additional passengers would fly. That is a really important improvement
for consumers. In scenario (2) the price would increase by 9.5$ and 55047
tickets less would be sold. Scenario (3) leads to a 0.6$ decrease in prices and
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Table 24: L.A. - N.Y.C., Profits, No Cost Efficiencies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WN
114519050 115673524 124719548 124344657 71434381 107445312
-5.58 -4.63 2.83 2.52 -41.1 -11.41
AA
109224166 93898972 97336321 101763350 79333654 107401531
12.64 -3.16 0.38 4.95 -18.18 10.76
UA
163734441 167448964 166928101 163595745 167255637 168516245
-2.06 0.16 -0.15 -2.14 0.04 0.8
B6
88898200 86652486 87393024 91589819 92642259 90602237
0.99 -1.57 -0.72 4.04 5.24 2.92
VX
77074428 75248402 75708447 76541506 76633788 76728043
1.85 -0.56 0.04 1.14 1.27 1.39
Table 25: L.A. - N.Y.C., Profits, 5% Cost Efficiencies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DL
115623106 116397531 124816481 125773232 72266048 108433453
-4.67 -4.03 2.91 3.7 -40.42 -10.6
AA
109986923 93950349 97918828 102288483 79935345 107530314
13.43 -3.11 0.98 5.49 -17.56 10.9
UA
163698818 169127274 168596625 165346857 167213301 168722082
-2.08 1.16 0.85 -1.1 0.02 0.92
B6
88887930 86725564 87405334 92308751 92620091 90535141
0.97 -1.48 -0.71 4.86 5.21 2.84
VX
77086807 75291680 75748037 76538741 76649061 77324059
1.86 -0.51 0.1 1.14 1.29 2.18
Table 26: L.A. - N.Y.C., Profits, 10% Cost Efficiencies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DL
116732224 117123795 124913452 127209183 73102252 109426009
-3.76 -3.43 2.99 4.88 -39.73 -9.78
AA
110752154 94001739 98502889 102814863 80539255 107659174
14.22 -3.06 1.59 6.03 -16.94 11.03
UA
163663198 170813953 170273446 167107216 167170968 168928045
-2.1 2.17 1.85 -0.04 -0.01 1.04
B6
88877661 86798673 87417644 93030254 92597906 90468070
0.96 -1.4 -0.7 5.68 5.19 2.77
VX
77099187 75334970 75787638 76535976 76664335 77922135
1.88 -0.45 0.15 1.14 1.31 2.97
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a 9332 increase in passengers. Scenario (4) generates an impressive 80$ de-
crease in prices, and 360965 additional passengers. Prices would increase by
14$ and quantities decrease by 189760 in scenario (5). Finally, scenario (6)
leads to a 44$ price decrease and a 165624 passengers increase. Obviously,
competition authorities would only wish for scenario (1), (4) or (6). Scenario
(3) generates an increase so close to zero that we will not focus on it. Are
scenarios (1), (4) and (6) profitable for firms ? In scenario (1), the newly
formed Delta-American entity would increase its joint profit by 5488950$.
In scenario (4), this same entity would increase its profits by 7853741$,
while the United-JetBlue entity would loose 26898$ in joint profits. In both
cases, the Delta-American entity increases its profits by reducing prices and
increasing its quantities, just like in the two previous markets. This seems
like a good sign that our model has some strength, because a merger between
the two same firms has a similar effects in all markets (which have different
structures), and whether or not other firms also merge (here it is United
with JetBlue, but in Market 1 it was Southwest with United). This signals
that there might be too much entry, a business-stealing effect that can be
found in the model of circular city from Salop (1979), with horizontal com-
petition. This also suggests that fixed costs should probably be taken into
account in an improvement of this paper. It seems coherent with the wave
of mergers the airline industry faced in the U.S.A. after the deregulation of
the industry in the late 70s: the number of airlines exploded, facilitated by
the possibility to rent planes, then the series of mergers tend to push the
number of airlines to its optimal level. We can thus expect more mergers to
come.
Introducing cost efficiencies allows the United-JetBlue entity to increase
their profits, so that scenario (4) becomes profitable for all merging parties,
and is actually even better than scenario (1) for consumers. In all cases, it
does not allow a merger that was harmful without cost efficiencies to become
beneficial, it simply makes them less harmful. The beneficial mergers on the
opposite get even more beneficial, but not dramatically: for instance, the
merger between Delta and American would lead to an additional decrease
in prices of 1.4$ and an additional increase in quantities of 4716 seats with
10% cost efficiencies. If United and JetBlue were also to merger, then it
would be by 2.4$ and 10944 passengers.
3.2.4 Market 4: Chicago - Los Angeles
This fourth market, the city pair Chicago - Los Angeles, is a medium haul
market. Indeed, the distance between Chicago and Los Angeles is 2803
kilometres, or 1742 miles, around 5 times the distance between San Francisco
and Los Angeles for instance. Similarly to the previous market, the greater
distance means less airlines represented in the market for direct flights. Table
27 presents the firms exploiting this market. The estimated price elasticity
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Table 27: Chicago - Los Angeles
Airline Price Quantities Marginal Costs Profits
WN 142.0 1689116 31.0 187362857
AA 153.6 92850 66.6 8074776
UA 190.7 348461 91.5 34568342
NK 74.9 59705 28.0 2795667
VX 180.0 187157 58.4 22762781
is:
Ed = − P
P −MC = −1.59 (33)
This is the most distant from the 1.2-1.5 range so far. The demand param-
eters are the following:
B′ =

−19405 69 −145 −21 −16
1353 −669 −23 −3 −17
815 57 −1915 4 −4
1579 123 954 −919 102
957 7 −21 34 −941
 (34)
and
a =

3790376
164623
670090
125166
354475
 (35)
Tables 28 to 33 present the results of the merger simulations.
As can be seen from Table 28, firms’ reactions are much more mild than
in the previous market. Moreover, none of the potential merger scenarios
presented here can be beneficial to consumers without cost efficiencies. With
5% cost efficiencies, the merger between American and United (scenario (3))
stops being harmful, but the price reduction is really close to zero (-0.07$).
It is the only one at this level of cost efficiencies, and at the 10% level. This
merger would also be profitable for the merging parties, starting from the
5% level as well, making an additional 1744342$ in joint profits. This is a
4% profit increase. At the 10% level there is a 8% increase in joint profits.
This is very similar to what happens in the previous market when the same
firms merge, so once again it shows some strength of the simulation model.
A similar case appeared earlier, so we can again believe that if American
and United propose a merger, then necessarily there will be cost efficiencies,
because the new entity would suffer from joint profit losses otherwise. This
shows how merger simulation can assess the credibility of the arguments of
the firms proposing the merger.
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In every cases, cost efficiencies again induce a greater price reduction or lower
price increase, and a greater quantity increase or lower quantity decrease.
3.2.5 Market 5: Miami - New York City
The last market that we will consider in this paper concerns the city pair
Miami - New York City. The two cities are 1753 kilometres apart, or 1089
miles. This is considered medium haul but it is very close to the limit be-
tween short and medium. Mechanically, more firms are present in the direct
flights market. They are presented in Table 34. The estimated elasticity is:
Ed = − P
P −MC = −1.37 (36)
It is very well within the range previously proposed. The demand parameters
used are the following:
B′ =

−215 305 123 54 62 4 1 0
1 −1606 −289 3 −122 −55 −2 0
0 −550 −1344 −183 −69 26 −5 −2
3 226 −343 −725 −222 31 −6 0
3 −390 −82 −237 −1513 128 12 0
2 −1222 658 207 845 −1713 −13 6
1 −358 −807 −540 976 −181 −181 16
2 123 −775 −44 −3 158 33 −63

(37)
and
a =

76225
978139
1113117
572401
724001
346461
40411
22924

(38)
Table 35 to Table 40 present the results of the same merger simulations as
in the Los Angeles - San Francisco market.
It turns out that the outcome is very similar to the one of the Los
Angeles - San Francisco market. This greatly supports the hypothesis that
the outcome of mergers will be similar in different markets given that the
same or similar firms interact on this market.
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Table 31: Chicago - L.A., Profits, No Cost Efficiencies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WN
187550687 186670967 188085385 188703660 187521014 186793312
0.1 -0.37 0.39 0.72 0.08 -0.3
AA
8125284 8071775 8093040 8217587 8099990 8104973
0.63 -0.04 0.23 1.77 0.31 0.37
UA
34469472 34270526 34494057 34690939 34262287 34475596
-0.29 -0.86 -0.21 0.35 -0.89 -0.27
NK
2790029 2790706 2793844 2792703 2784083 2788520
-0.2 -0.18 -0.07 -0.11 -0.41 -0.26
VX
22739870 22756281 22745414 22731533 22716862 22737538
-0.1 -0.03 -0.08 -0.14 -0.2 -0.11
Table 32: Chicago - L.A., Profits, 5% Cost Efficiencies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WN
190002893 189131100 187701777 190858468 189661520 189311582
1.41 0.94 0.18 1.87 1.23 1.04
AA
8416746 8051523 8372908 8485353 8363428 8097940
4.24 -0.29 3.69 5.08 3.57 0.29
UA
34491667 35804991 36014553 36101998 35700840 34492943
-0.22 3.58 4.18 4.44 3.28 -0.22
NK
2791311 2791196 2793868 2875475 2866960 2786650
-0.16 -0.16 -0.06 2.85 2.55 -0.32
VX
22746455 22760057 22751546 22728908 22714045 23271643
-0.07 -0.01 -0.05 -0.15 -0.21 2.24
Table 33: Chicago - L.A., Profits, 10% Cost Efficiencies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WN
192471005 191607323 187318561 193025485 191814143 191846648
2.73 2.27 -0.02 3.02 2.38 2.39
AA
8713160 8031297 8657309 8757235 8630865 8090911
7.91 -0.54 7.21 8.45 6.89 0.2
UA
34513870 37370471 37565615 37539649 37166810 34510294
-0.16 8.11 8.67 8.6 7.52 -0.17
NK
2792593 2791686 2793891 2959428 2951021 2784781
-0.11 -0.14 -0.06 5.86 5.56 -0.39
VX
22753041 22763834 22757678 22726282 22711228 23811654
-0.04 0 -0.02 -0.16 -0.23 4.61
38
Table 34: Miami - New York City
Airline Price Quantity Marginal Cost Profit
WN 190.6 37605 29.4 6060899
DL 214.4 398103 61.5 60899007
AA 220.0 530561 63.1 83236640
UA 250.3 269873 86.6 44171872
B6 219.7 492518 43.3 86881907
NK 105.6 205493 26.5 16235559
F9 100.0 26309 32.3 1780528
VX 171.8 13453 55.2 1567632
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Table 38: Miami - N.Y.C., Profits, No Cost Efficiencies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WN
6061971 6060228 6060492 6049168 6065894 6067060
0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.19 0.08 0.1
DL
60043484 60420071 58956836 62533633 57663978 58096056
-1.4 -0.79 -3.19 2.68 -5.31 -4.6
AA
81994223 83223048 86742304 82991781 79849182 79892532
-1.49 -0.02 4.21 -0.29 -4.07 -4.02
UA
44333377 44009121 44980878 45002019 44349664 44446382
0.37 -0.37 1.83 1.88 0.4 0.62
B6
86418497 86860870 88798399 88451489 85480876 85502109
-0.53 -0.02 2.21 1.81 -1.61 -1.59
NK
16148376 16244296 16487236 15998023 16059076 16063789
-0.54 0.05 1.55 -1.46 -1.09 -1.06
F9
1777937 1779213 1802433 1815953 1769302 1772009
-0.15 -0.07 1.23 1.99 -0.63 -0.48
VX
1567000 1566510 1580460 1582808 1564766 1565980
-0.04 -0.07 0.82 0.97 -0.18 -0.11
Table 39: Miami - N.Y.C., Profits, 5% Cost Efficiencies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WN
6117057 6115604 6060586 6103220 6120180 6173266
0.93 0.9 -0.01 0.7 0.98 1.85
DL
61236555 60578786 60488495 63822136 58829861 60324332
0.55 -0.53 -0.67 4.8 -3.4 -0.94
AA
82094554 84870165 88672984 85076841 81751123 80249692
-1.37 1.96 6.53 2.21 -1.78 -3.59
UA
44308706 44074366 45051222 46297466 45562931 45636538
0.31 -0.22 1.99 4.81 3.15 3.32
B6
86455539 86861189 88866801 88626315 85623942 86740572
-0.49 -0.02 2.28 2.01 -1.45 -0.16
NK
16156419 16239776 16493165 15997772 16058772 16064074
-0.49 0.03 1.59 -1.46 -1.09 -1.06
F9
1778171 1779838 1803531 1818512 1771399 1772408
-0.13 -0.04 1.29 2.13 -0.51 -0.46
VX
1567073 1567077 1581206 1583706 1565487 1566109
-0.04 -0.04 0.87 1.03 -0.14 -0.1
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Table 40: Miami - N.Y.C, Profits, 10% Cost Efficiencies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WN
6172392 6171231 6060679 6157512 6174707 6174520
1.84 1.82 0 1.59 1.88 1.87
DL
62441334 60737709 62038865 65123755 60007294 60270371
2.53 -0.26 1.87 6.94 -1.46 -1.03
AA
82194946 86531360 90622603 87185000 83673283 80419127
-1.25 3.96 8.87 4.74 0.52 -3.38
UA
44284042 44139660 45121620 47609507 46791495 46893468
0.25 -0.07 2.15 7.78 5.93 6.16
B6
86492589 86861508 88935229 88801314 85767127 87918825
-0.45 -0.02 2.36 2.21 -1.28 1.19
NK
16164464 16235257 16499095 15997521 16058468 16047896
-0.44 0 1.62 -1.47 -1.09 -1.16
F9
1778406 1780463 1804630 1821074 1773497 1772414
-0.12 0 1.35 2.28 -0.39 -0.46
VX
1567146 1567644 1581952 1584603 1566208 1566099
-0.03 0 0.91 1.08 -0.09 -0.1
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4 Conclusion
As a safety check, the same merger simulations were performed using a
general pricing model rather than a quantity setting model. As expected
regarding the elements stressed in the introduction, the results did not make
much sense: all percentage changes were extremely close to zero (in absolute
value, in the e−14 to e−10 range). An example for Market 1 is provided in
the Appendix, to be compared with Table 7. This should confirm that the
quantity game is indeed a safer choice when studying the airline industry.
Several steps were needed to perform these merger simulations. First of all,
a cost function had to be estimated, based on data aggregated to the airline,
national and quarterly level. The quantity variable used was the number of
passengers. Different motivated explanatory variables, whose construction
was detailed, were also used to control for commonly accepted cost drivers,
as well as time and airline dummies. The cost function estimation was
performed using a standard Ordinary Least Square method, in logarithms,
that allowed to recover the marginal cost function. The results of the estima-
tion appeared quite robust, and the estimated Lerner index for the markets
seemed coherent with the elasticities already estimated. Moreover, low-cost
airlines were indeed found to have a cheaper technology than standard air-
lines. Additionally, airline and market specific linear demand functions were
recovered using previously estimated own and cross price elasticities.
The merger simulations were then based on a general quantity game, derived
from the profit maximization of airline groups, that is joint profit maximiza-
tion. This required matrix form computations that were presented. These
simulations were then performed on the top five U.S. domestic markets, each
time with six different merger scenarios envisaged. Some mergers scenarios
were repeated across markets, and others were not. This allowed for differ-
ent kind of comparisons, across markets and within markets. Within each
markets and for each scenarios, three different cases were simulated regard-
ing cost efficiencies, to investigate the extent to which airlines would pass
them on to consumers.
Several results are worth stressing from this exercise. All markets are not
similar, and the definition of this market is important. In our case we defined
markets as direct flights between domestic city pairs. This can obviously be
improved but was beyond the scope of the paper. Whether or not using
these markets is sufficient to assess the outcome of mergers is not clear.
Indeed, we saw that the number of airlines present in a market diminishes
with the distance between the two cities, as more indirect flights are pro-
posed. Moreover, performing the simulation in a single market is already
quite tedious and computationally intensive. Investigating the nation-wide
impact of mergers between airlines based on market-level simulations thus
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appears as a complex exercise, as it would require to perform the simulation
on all markets, which are moreover difficult to define individually. It appears
however that the outcome of merger simulations is similar between markets
that have close characteristics, such as the present airlines, their number
and their type (standard vs. low-cost), or the distance. If this turns out
to be true (it would require more simulations to assess this), then it might
be possible to perform merger simulations on a few representative markets,
and weight their outcome to obtain a credible idea for all domestic markets.
Another important point is the heterogeneity of merger outcomes between
scenarios. From one scenario to the other, but not from one market to a
similar one, the absolute changes in prices, quantities and profits range from
0% to more than 75%. This stresses the importance of considering airlines as
heterogeneous goods. It however generates surprising results. For instance,
the fact that some merging airlines would reduce their prices and increase
their quantities even without cost efficiencies. A few possible explanations
were proposed, but it might rely more on the point made before, that is
market definition. How do passengers really plan their trip ? The fact that
some passengers can fix a budget for the round trip, and try to get the best
service for that budget, shows that some airlines can be considered com-
plements: for instance, standard airlines can be complements between each
other, while they can be substitutes with low-cost airlines. This might be
true and would explain the U.S. airline consolidation. It is also possible that
the market definition is again not correct: should low-cost and standard air-
lines be considered in the same market ? It is worth noting that all negative
price changes without cost efficiencies are really close to zero, except for the
merger between Delta and American, so they might instead be considered as
an approximated zero. Regarding the merger between Delta and American,
a strategic decision was recently observed: soon after Delta proposed a new
fidelity program based on the money spent by passengers to replace the one
based on the miles flown by passengers, American did the same. Overall,
we saw that some mergers could be beneficial among the four major air-
lines. This might be translated by major airlines that additionally proposed
low-cost services, leading to the recent distinction between these and “ultra
low-cost carriers” (the classical low-cost carrier as is often known), after the
recent mergers. The position might be considered too dominant: if United
and American were to merge (the two smallest in this top 4), they would
own more than 30% of the U.S. domestic market share. Still, this exercise
supports that it might be more optimal to allow for some more mergers,
even though the resulting position would be quite dominant, similarly to a
natural monopoly for instance. This is not observed with airlines that have
low fixed costs (the low-costs airlines). There might thus be, again, an inter-
est in studying markets for low-costs and standard airlines separately. The
market for low-costs airlines could be modelled as we did, while the market
for standard airlines could be modelled taking into account fixed costs, us-
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ing models of entry, adaptation and exit. This distinction can be found in
papers such as Ciliberto & Tamer (2009) that show that competitive effects
differ between the largest, non low-cost airlines and the low-cost airlines.
Low-cost airlines often rent the aircrafts, while standard airlines often buy
them.
An additional improvement could be using non-linear demand functions, but
much more time would have been required to do that as the methodology
would have relied on iterated best responses. Coordinated effects are also
worth investigating in an improved version of this paper, as only unilateral
effects were considered here.
Overall, the paper suggests that the wave of deregulation then mergers might
have been, and might still be, an efficient way to naturally select the “win-
ners” of the industry, which will most likely be more strictly regulated in the
future. This might have allowed to concentrate the industry which would
not have been sustainable otherwise, to keep the most efficient airlines (those
that survived competition) and, in the future, to regulate these survivors.
47
5 Appendix
Figure 1: Residuals vs. Leverage Plot for Regression (4) of Table 2
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